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Marital Conflict Mediation and Post-Separation
Wife Abuse
Desmond Ellis*
The primary objective of this paper is to identify individual,
couple (relational), and situational factors which increase the
likelihood of post-separation abuse of women who participate
in the informal marital conflict resolution process known as
mediation. The four factors identified as risk markers for
post-separation violence are power differences, pre-separation
violence, privacy norms, and alcohol and drug abuse. Each of
these may be subsumed under one or other of the four types of
variables entering into Megargee's "algebra of aggression."
Introduction
Marital conflicts ending in separation and divorce are a
"growth industry."1 Expanding equally as quickly is the marital
conflict resolution industry.2 Within this industry, the informal
conflict resolution process known as mediation 3 is growing espe-
cially rapidly,4 disclosing many advantages and disadvantages.5
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1. See generally Graham B. Spanier, Married and Unmarried Cohabitation in
the United States: 1980, 45 J. Marriage & Fam. 277 (1983) (March 1980 Current Pop-
ulation Survey data used, in part, to show changes between 1975 and 1980 in demo-
graphic characteristics pertaining to married and unmarried couples). See also
Statistics Canada, Marrying and Divorcing: A Status Report for Canada (Oct. 1988).
2. The marital conflict resolution industry includes those formal (legal) and
informal institutions and agencies involved in the process of resolving marital con-
flicts. Settlements, orders, contracts, and decisions are the outcomes or "products"
of these institutions and agencies. Adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and concili-
ation are included among the means used to produce the outcomes referred to
above.
The industry itself is divided into two fields: the traditional, adversarial, for-
mal-legal field, whose practitioners are lawyers and judges; and the "alternative
dispute resolution field" whose modal practitioners, mediators and conciliators,
seek "the informal and prompt resolution of disputes." Alan Dranitzke, Legally
Speaking: Federal ADR, Mediation Rep., March 1989, at 2.
3. See Dean G. Pruitt & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stale-
mate, and Settlement 166 (1986).
4. See Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 57, 68 (1984).
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One major disadvantage, according to mediation critics, is the link
between marital mediation and continuing physical harm to wives
who participate in mediation.6 Specifically, critics contend that, in
a variety of ways, mediation facilitates aggression against wife-par-
ticipants by the male spouses from whom they are separating or
are separated.7
The primary purpose of this paper is to identify four factors
which, in Megargee's theory of aggression,S have the status of risk
markers9 for violence generally and violence against separated wo-
men in particular. The presence of these markers in married or
cohabiting couples should serve as a warning signal to the counsel-
lors and other professionals who interact with them that woman
abuse may be present in the relationship and that mediation would
be a debilitative means of resolving the couple's problems.
Marital Status and Wife Abuse
Some time ago, Murray Straus suggested that "the marriage
license [was] a hitting license." 10 Accepting this as true, then one
solution to the problem of woman abuse is for wives to separate
from their husbands. Some abused wives do this;11 those who do
not may stay with the husbands who beat them because, as Okun
5. See Pruitt & Rubin, supra note 3, at 179-82. For an historical review of me-
diation in Canada, see Audrey Devlin & Judith P. Ryan, Family Mediation in Can-
ada, Past, Present, and Future Developments, 11 Mediation Q. 93 (1986).
6. Linda Girdner, Mediating Divorce in the Shadow of Violence 9, 10 (paper
presented at the Academy of Family Mediators Meeting, New York, July 1987). See
also Lerman, supra note 4, at 86-87 (noting that mediated agreements may inadver-
tently make woman abuse more probable by tacitly legitimating male violence
against female partners who fail to live up to the terms of the agreement); Dianna
R. Stallone, Decriminalization of Violence in the Home: Mediation in Wife Bat-
tering Cases, 2 Law & Inequality 493, 511 (1984) ("Mediation methods are danger-
ous because they fail to deter future life-threatening abuse .... [T]hey also fail to
communicate to the abuser that his conduct is wrong.").
7. Lerman, supra note 4, at 83-87; Stallone, supra note 6, at 510-17.
8. Edwin I. Megargee, Psychological Determinants and Correlates of Criminal
Violence, in Criminal Violence 81 (Marvin E. Wolfgang & Neil Alan Weiner eds.
1982).
9. A risk marker is any attribute or experience of the abuser, the victim, or
the couple which increases the likelihood of abuse above the level of chance. For
an example of research on risk markers for woman abuse, see Gerald T. Hotaling &
David B. Sugarman, An Analysis of Risk Markers in Husband to Wife Violence:
The Current State of Knowledge, 1 Violence & Victims 101 (1986).
10. Murray A. Straus, The Marriage License as a Hitting License: Evidence
from Popular Culture, Law, and Social Science, in The Social Causes of Husband-
Wife Violence 39, 40 (Murray A. Straus & Gerald T. Hotaling eds. 1980).
11. See Desmond Ellis, Male Abuse of a Married or Cohabiting Female Partner:
The Application of Sociological Theory to Research Findings, 4 Violence & Victims
235 (1989).
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has noted, "even if she doesn't stay, he may keep showing up."12
When ex-husbands show up, the results can be lethal. Estrange-
ment is implicated in a significant proportion of "deadly quarrels"
between husbands and wives, cohabitors, and lovers.13 Separated
and divorced women are also disproportionately represented
among victims of rapes and assaults.'4 In a significant number of
cases, their rapists and assailants are ex-partners, and the violence
occurs during or after the process of separation.' 5
In this connection, Serum considers the abuser to be "most
dangerous" at these times.16 Other research indicates that vio-
lence against wives is associated with the transition from one mar-
ital status (married) to another (separated/divorced). 17 A key
factor in this transition is the kind of marital conflict resolution
process in which the couple becomes involved.'8
12. Lewis Okun, Woman Abuse: Facts Replacing Myths 43 (1986).
13. See Gwynn Nettler, Killing One Another 108-20 (1983).
14. Bowker's perusal of National Crime Survey data reveals that "compared
with married women, separated or divorced women are about six times as likely to
be raped or robbed, [and] five times as likely to be assaulted .. " Lee H. Bowker,
Women as Victims: An Examination of the Results of L.E.A.A. 's National Crime
Survey Program, in Women and Crime in America 158, 164-65 (Lee H. Bowker ed.
1981).
15. Giles-Sims reports that 44% of women in shelters were abused by their
spouses after they had left them. Jean Giles-Sims, Wife Battering: A Systems The-
ory Approach (1983) (cited in Linda MacLeod, Battered But Not Beaten: Prevent-
ing Wife Battering in Canada 20 (1987)). The Solicitor General of Canada found
most of the assaults against women who were separated from their spouses were
committed by a spouse (34%) or ex-spouse (20%). Solicitor General of Canada, Ca-
nadian Urban Victimization Survey: Female Victims of Crime 4 (1985) (bulletin).
United States Department of Justice researchers report that "spouses or ex-spouses
committed two-thirds of the violent crimes by relatives against women." United
States Department of Justice, Violent Crime by Strangers and Non-Strangers 2
(January 1987) (special report).
16. Okun, supra note 12, at 81 (citing Camella S. Serum, Battered Women and
Batterers (lecture presented at the Hoyt Conference Center, Eastern Michigan Uni-
versity, Ypsilanti, Michigan, May 9, 1979)).
17. Desmond Ellis & Walter DeKeseredy, Marital Status and Woman Abuse:
The DAD Model, - Int'l J. Soc. Fain. - (forthcoming); Judith Wallerstein & Joan
Kelly, Surviving the Breakup 28-30 (1980).
18. See Desmond Ellis, Post-Separation Woman Abuse: The Contribution of
Lawyers as "Barracudas," "Advocates, "and "Counsellors," 10 Int'l J. L. & Psychia-
try 403, 408-10 (1987) [hereinafter Contribution of Lawyers]; Kenneth Kressel, Mar-
tin Lopez-Morillas, Janet Weinglass & Morton Deutsch, Professional Intervention
in Divorce: The Views of Lawyers, Psychotherapists, and Clergy, in Divorce and
Separation: Context, Causes and Consequences 246 (George Levinger & Oliver C.
Moles eds. 1979) [hereinafter Professional Intervention]. The authors note that
couples who negotiate directly with each other in the presence of a mediator are
likely to experience fewer post-separation problems than couples who have lawyers
to represent them. Role strain and an adversarial legal system are partly responsi-
ble for the relative ineffectiveness of formal, legal intervention in the divorce pro-
cess. Id. See also Robert S. Weiss, Marital Separation 254-77 (1975).
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"Lawyering" Marital Conflicts: Mediators' Critiques
If strictly legal expenditures are used as an indicator, it is ob-
vious that most separating couples hire lawyers to negotiate solu-
tions to marital conflicts over property, ongoing financial support,
and child custody and visitation.19 According to many writers who
support mediation as an alternative marital conflict resolution pro-
cess, the attributes of the formal legal system, including its practi-
tioners, tend to make life worse for separating/divorcing spouses
and their children.20
First and foremost, the legal system's adversarial nature re-
quires lawyers to play the role of warriors whose primary objective
is winning for their clients.21 This tends to convert conflicts which
may have been solved with gains to both parties and their children
(positive-sum conflicts)2 2 into conflicts in which one spouse's gain
is the other's loss (zero-sum conflicts). 23 Feelings of antagonism
tend to be more strongly associated with zero-sum than with posi-
tive-sum conflicts.24 Thus, adversarial resolution of marital con-
flicts, according to supporters of mediation, increases animosity
between the parties.2 5
19. See Daniel Camozzi, Divorce Mediation, Therapy Now, Spring 1985, at 20.
20. See Jay Folberg & Alison Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide for
Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation 33-36 (1984); Joan B. Kelly, Mediated and
Adversarial Divorce: Comparisons of Client Perceptions and Satisfaction (proceed-
ings, Family Mediation: The Second Annual Conference, Banff, Alberta, 1987); Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Family Law 16 (1976).
21. See O.J. Coogler, Changing the Lawyer's Role in Matrimonial Practice,
Conciliation Cts. Rev., Sept. 1977, at 1; H.H. Irving & B.B. Irving, Conciliation
Counseling Divorce Litigation, 16 Rep. Fain. L. 257 (1974); Jessica Pearson &
Nancy Thoennes, Custody Mediation in Denver: Short and Longer Term _ffects, in
The Resolution of Family Conflict: Comparative Legal Perspectives 248, 249 (John
M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds. 1984).
22. These concepts are taken from game theory. In a zero-sum, two person
game, whatever one player wins, the other loses and vice versa. In a positive-sum
game, a win for one player does not entail a corresponding loss for the other player.
Both may be better off, albeit not equally. An exchange relationship (e.g., money
for goods) is an example of a positive-sum relation. Most wars which are won by
one side are zero-sum games. See generally Abraham Kaplan, Mathematics and So-
cial Analysis, in Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior 81 (Mar-
tin Shubik ed. 1964).
23. For a critical discussion of both kinds of conflicts, see P.H. Gulliver, Dis-
putes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective 148-50 (1979).
24. See id. at 180-81; Coogler, supra note 21, at 1-2.
25. Professional Intervention, supra note 18, at 250 ("[T]he law's formal bias,
the availability of legal threats and counter-threats, as well as the emotional agita-
tion of clients, may push even the most cooperative of lawyers toward serious esca-
lation of conflict."); Frontenac Family Referral Service, Couples in Crisis II: The
Kingston Mediation Model 2 (1984) ("The adversarial process pits one partner
against the other and often has the undesirable effect of exacerbating those atti-
tudes and feelings which contributed to the marriage breakdown.") [hereinafter
Crisis II].
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Second, because of the coercive nature of the system, the par-
ties are more likely to evade, than to comply with, agreements or
settlements which adjudication produces.26
Third, Rifkin contends that a "male ideology of law," that is,
a legal system characterized by a "patriarchal paradigm," "hierar-
chy," and "combat," constitutes a traditional male jurisprudence
which helps maintain male dominance when divorcing couples in-
volve lawyers and judges in the process of marital dispute resolu-
tion.27 Involvement in the formal legal system subordinates
female concerns with "responsibility and justice" and female reli-
ance on subjectivity as a method to male notions of the "reason-
able man," "rationality," "hierarchy," winning, and male reliance
on objectivity as method.28 In sum, women should avoid "lawyer-
ing" and adjudication and embrace mediation because "mediating
disputes reflects feminist jurisprudential differences from the
male ideology of law"29 which are oriented towards "a new rela-
tion between life and law,"30 a relation characterized by greater
equality between men and women. The outcomes or "settlements"
of mediation will reflect this newer, more equal male/female
relationship.3 1
Fourth, a number of scholars and mediators allege that adju-
dication is inappropriate when it is applied to resolve disputes of
couples who are involved in emotional, intimate, established, mul-
tiplex relationships in which dependent children are often impli-
cated.3 2 Alternative dispute resolution processes such as mediation
are more appropriate because mediators are less likely than adju-
dicators or lawyers to be concerned with the legal objective of rule
maintenance, less likely to see things in black/white terms with
respect to rules, more likely to compromise, more likely to take
26. See Crisis II, supra note 25, at 2. See also Annemette Sorensen & Maurice
MacDonald, Does Child Support Support the Children?, 4 Children & Youth Serv-
ices Rev. 53, 55 (1982) (noting the general problem of non-compliance with child
support orders).
27. Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and
Problems, 2 Law & Inequality 21 (1984).
28. See id. at 23, 24.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id. at 23 (citing Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 645 (1983)).
31. See id. at 30-31.
32. Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, 1
Mediation Q. 3, 9-10 (1983) ("Divorce is a multifaceted experience that combines
emotional, legal, and family processes. The strong emotional forces accompanying
the dissolution of an existing family relationship require measures more delicately
wrought than those that can be provided in a court-imposed solution."). See also
Max Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia 396
(1967); Gulliver, supra note 23, at 14-15.
Law and Inequality
the trouble to learn what the normative expectations, interests,
and emotions of the contending partner are, and more likely to
structure couple-solutions to problems with these factors in
mind.33
Finally, litigation is not only less civilized than mediation, it
is also more costly, both emotionally and economically.3 4 Notwith-
standing these qualifications, the alleged defects of the family law
system have led, in recent years, to the use of mediation as an al-
ternative conflict resolution process.3 5
Taken together, a perusal of these mediation-biased criticisms
of lawyer negotiation, litigation, and adjudication yields the follow-
ing general conclusions. First, the criticisms tend to be stated in
ways that are uncharacteristic of the professional mediator's ap-
proach to conflict in general and lawyer/mediator conflicts in par-
ticular. Specifically, the critics seem to be as interested in
"winning over" an audience to their professional orientation as
they are in either mediating their own conflicts with lawyers or in
displaying a willingness to compromise, a willingness to convert
zero-sum professional conflicts into positive-sum (mutual gains)
conflicts.
Second, the criticisms tend to be stated in rather general, di-
chotomous, black/white terms. Thus, mediators routinely take the
time and trouble to obtain information on their clients' expecta-
tions, interests, and emotional states, but lawyers--or negotiators
for their own clients--do not. As Gulliver points out, however,
there is nothing inherent in negotiation which vitiates any attempt
lawyers make to do these things or to learn how to do them.36 In
addition, a number of lawyers are also mediators who, in providing
legal information, provide information that is "general and impar-
tial" as compared with legal advice which "involves a specific sug-
gestion to pursue or refrain from a particular course of conduct
and, therefore, constitutes a form of representation."3 7
Third, one is told in rather explicit terms that the family law
system is inappropriate for dealing with emotionally intense, mul-
tiplex relations of separating and divorcing couples. Implicitly, one
is led to believe that mediation is appropriate for such conflicts.
33. Gulliver, supra note 23, at 14-15.
34. See Donald W. Lindholm, The Mediation Succeeds, the Mediation Fails:
What Do You Owe Each Party?, Faro. Advoc., Winter 1987, at 14, 15-16; Pearson &
Thoennes, supra note 21, at 249.
35. See Devlin & Ryan, supra note 5, at 93; Folberg, supra note 32, at 6.
36. Gulliver, supra note 23, at 15.
37. Lawrence D. Gaugan, Divorce Mediation: A Lawyer's View, Faro. Advoc.,
Summer 1986, at 34-35.
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Are there no marital conflicts for which lawyer negotiations, liti-
gation, and adjudication are appropriate? Conversely, is mediation
appropriate and risk-free for every kind of marital dispute?
Fourth, to equate the extant family law system with patri-
archy and mediation with feminism is to provide a parsimonious
but misleading characterization of the two kinds of dispute resolu-
tion systems. In my own experience as a client of mediation, as
one who experienced litigation and adjudication, as a person who
has played the role of "wife abuser" before an audience of profes-
sional mediators,38 and as an academic who has studied the topic,
mediation has no obvious greater autonomy from its male-domi-
nated societal context than does negotiation and litigation. Both
tend to reproduce, rather than contest, male domination. Indeed,
where violence against the wife is present, the formal legal system
is likely to take a more feminist (stop the violence) stance than is
mediation.
Fifth, mediation is not routinely less costly, emotionally or
economically, than negotiation involving lawyers. Couples pay an
additional emotional price for bungled mediation 39 just as they do
for bungled negotiations. The contention that mediation is eco-
nomically less costly than lawyer negotiations is either not sup-
ported by research findings40 or supported by findings which show
that it is more economical for men than for women.4 1
Mediation as an Alternative
As a marital conflict resolution process, mediation is charac-
terized by self-help, informality, compromise, identification of un-
derlying causes, and impartial, third party facilitation of
communication. 42 Mediated agreements by their nature constitute
38. North American Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution,
Montreal, Canada, March 1989. Lisa Lerman played the abused wife and Linda
Girdner mediated.
39. See Gaugan, supra note 37, at 35.
40. C. James Richardson, Court-Based Divorce Mediation in Four Canadian Cit-
ies: An Overview of Research Results 40 (1988).
41. Id.
42. Janet Rifkin offers the following "highlights [of] some of the main contrasts
between adjudication and the practice of mediation": public vs. private, formal vs.
informal, strict rules of evidence vs. no formal rule parameters, conflict vs. consen-
sus, win/lose vs. compromise, decisions vs. agreements, rule oriented vs. person ori-
ented, representation by lawyer vs. direct participation. Rifkin, supra note 27, at
25-26. See also William L.F. Felstiner & Lynne A. Williams, Mediation as an Alter-
native to Criminal Prosecution: Ideology and Limitations, 2 Law & Hum. Behav.
223, 234 (1978); Folberg & Taylor, supra note 20, at 26-36; Ontario Association for
Family Mediation, Code of Ethics, in Ontario Association for Family Mediation, Di-
rectory of Family Mediators in Ontario ii (1986) [hereinafter Ontario Association];
Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 21, at 249-50.
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agreements reached by the parties themselves; they are "privately
ordered."43 Each party takes personal responsibility for the agree-
ment and, therefore, each party is more likely to abide by its
terms.44 This contributes markedly to a post-separation life char-
acterized by separate but peaceful co-existence. 45
The same outcome obtains during the process of mediation
because the process itself focuses on the underlying causes of in-
compatibility. Primary mediation tools include cooperation, com-
promise, and development of a belief by the couple that the locus
of control lies with them.4 6 Under these conditions, mediation pro-
duces "improved spousal relations" between ex-spouses. 47 Thus,
mediation appears to be a superior method of conflict resolution,
particularly in terms of the parties' emotional stability and
welfare.48
A review of the empirical research results which allegedly
support this rather optimistic conclusion, however, yields two less
sanguine findings.49 First, mediation may have benign post-separa-
tion/divorce consequences for some couples under some circum-
stances and less benign consequences for other couples under the
same or different circumstances. 50 Second, as a professional group,
mediators tend to avoid thinking theoretically about, or doing em-
pirical research on, the relationship between mediation and wo-
43. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits of Private Order-
ing, in The Resolution of Family Conflict: Comparative Legal Perspectives 364
(John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds. 1984). According to Mnookin, "private
ordering" refers to a legal framework in which couples themselves have "great
freedom" to determine their "postdissolution rights and responsibilities." Id.
Mnookin draws a contrast between private ordering and a legal framework to
which the external regulation of post-dissolution rights and responsibilities is cen-
tral. The latter, he says, has given way to the former. Id.
44. Crisis II, supra note 25, at 1-7.
45. Id.
46. See Folberg, supra note 32, at 9-10.
47. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 21, at 258. See also Howard H. Irving &
Michael Benjamin, A Study of Conciliation Counselling in the Family Court of To-
ronto: Implications for Socio-Legal Practice, in The Resolution of Family Conflict
268 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds. 1984).
48. For a review of the advantages and disadvantages of informal justice, see 1
The Politics of Informal Justice: The American Experience (Richard L. Abel ed.
1982).
49. Here it is relevant to note that the "fundamental issues" currently facing
mediation are defined not in terms of providing theory and more valid and reliable
research results on the specific kinds of issues or conflicts for which mediation is
most effective, but in terms of professional matters having to do with "[c]redentials,
licensing, confidentiality and the availability of full-time paid employment .... "
Roger Lesser, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Crossroads, Mediation Rep., March
1989, at 1.
50. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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man abuse.S1
Research: Effects of Mediation on Spousal Relations
Supporters of mediation tend to refer to a relatively small
number of empirical studies which clearly demonstrate to them
the advantages of mediation over negotiation and/or litigation in-
volving lawyers, courts, and judges. One of the best designed of
these, the Denver Mediation Study conducted by Pearson and
Thoennes, is frequently cited for its findings and conclusions
(presented together with relevant study design/analysis details in
their Table 16.1).52 This table shows that couples who signed a
separation agreement (the successful mediation group) were more
likely to report friendly or less hostile relationships with their ex-
partners than couples who chose adjudication.53 Pearson and
Thoennes' Table 16.1 does not relate any information about the
process of mediation and the relationship between mediation and
improved spousal relations.
If mediation works the way the Denver Mediation Study au-
thors describe it, then within-group differences between the two
mediation samples should be less than the differences between the
two mediation and the two lawyer/court samples. Contrarily,
Pearson and Thoennes report that the differences in the percent-
ages reporting "no worse than 'strained' relations" within the two
groups of mediating couples are greater than the differences be-
tween the mediation and the two lawyer couple groups!5 4 Specifi-
cally, the percentages reporting "no worse than 'strained'
relations" for the successful and unsuccessful mediation groups are
81% and 50% respectively; for the two lawyer-only groups, "Con-
trol" and "'Rejecting,'" the comparable percentages are 41% and
45%.55 The mean for the mediation group is 65%; the percentage
difference is 31%.56 The comparable percentages for the lawyer-
only groups are 43% and 4%.57 The difference between the media-
tion and lawyer-only groups is 22%. An analysis of variance on
these groups would almost certainly reveal a statistically non-sig-
nificant association between mediation and lawyer effects on re-
51. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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ported spousal relations.58
Further, of the 125 couples who began as participants in me-
diation, approximately one-half (n=63) did not successfully com-
plete the process.5 9 Pearson and Thoennes provide no explanation
for this anomaly. Other research indicates that angrier couples are
less likely to enter into and/or successfully complete mediation.60
This finding suggests that couples in the successful mediation
group more frequently reported less hostile relations than couples
in the other groups simply because the couples who successfully
mediated were less angry to begin with.6 1
Taken together, these two considerations raise serious ques-
tions about the internal validity of Pearson and Thoennes' finding
that mediation has benign effects on post-separation relations be-
tween spouses. Their study remains, in terms of its design (field
experimental/longitudinal) and relatively large sample size, the
best research done to date on the effects of mediation. Neverthe-
less, intensive analysis reveals that the association between media-
tion and improved spousal relations is ambiguous in the Pearson
and Thoennes study. The few other, less sophisticated studies that
have been published do not appear to be any less ambiguous. 62
58. This kind of statistical analysis involves comparing within-group variations
with between-group variations.
59. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 21, at 256.
60. See Stephen J. Bahr, C. Bradford Chappell & Anastasios C. Marcos, An
Evaluation of a Trial Mediation Program, 18 Mediation Q. 37, 41 (1987).
61. Pearson and Thoennes did introduce a number of control variables in an at-
tempt to eliminate several rival hypotheses. However, they do not appear to have
controlled on initial differences in anger. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 21,
at 260-62. If Kressel, et al. are correct, their failure to control on the "emotional
reactivity" of couples and on their knowledge of "bargaining, substance and proce-
dure" raises serious doubts about the finding of a positive association between suc-
cessful mediation per se and improved spousal relations. See Professional
Intervention, supra note 18, at 270.
62. For example, in the Wheeler study, voluntary agreements and court orders
were compared with respect to regularity of support payments, but the number of
voluntary agreements that were mediated is not given. Michael Wheeler, Separa-
tion and After: Implications for Policy and Practice 18 (1980). In any event, the au-
thor found "no evidence that voluntary agreements are more likely to be honoured
than court orders.... The amount and regularity of payments would appear to de-
pend... on the ability to pay." Id.
The Frontenac Family Referral Service study of post separation violence did
not involve systematic comparisons between clients randomly assigned to mediated
and non-mediated cases. Crisis II, supra note 25, at 15-17, 35-40. In the Attorney
General of Ontario Report on the effects of court based mediation on "future court
appearances," similar data on non-mediated cases were not collected. Ministry of
the Attorney General Research Services, Evaluation of Mediation Services: Prelimi-
nary Report 18 (1986). The Kressel, et al. study on past-divorce adjustment is based
on the intensive analysis of only nine cases. Professional Intervention, supra note
18, at 269. These couples were precisely the kind of couples for whom mediation is
most likely to be effective, i.e., articulate, knowledgeable, middle-class couples. Yet,
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One shared attribute of studies conducted by supporters of
mediation, including Pearson and Thoennes, is an apparent unwill-
ingness to examine or even to discuss the problem of wife abuse in
the context of mediating marital conflicts. A review of all issues of
Mediation Quarterly, the major outlet for mediation theory, re-
search, and practice, reveals that the journal has not published one
theoretical or research article specifically on mediation and wife
abuse since its inception in 1983.63 A perusal of the indices of all
issues reveals only one reference to woman abuse.64 There is only
one reference in the indices to either violence or aggression.65 De-
spite the fact that violence and abuse are part of the history and
the future of a significant number of separating and divorcing wo-
men,66 these ways of behaving and the effects of mediation upon
them appear not to be theoretically or socially significant enough
to warrant theory and research on the topic.67
This lack of empirical data means that counsellors and clergy
recommend mediation as an appropriate means of conflict resolu-
tion for couples where the wife has been (or is being) abused based
on criteria other than the effects of mediation on abuse. These in-
clude ideology, professional self-interest, and unsystematically col-
lected data drawn from practical experience. For one or more of
these reasons, the State of New York and the chief police prosecu-
tor in Cleveland, Ohio, believe that wife abuse cases can be suc-
cessfully mediated,68 while the National Center on Women and
Family Law and the PINS Mediation Project of New York believe
the results are inconsistent, five being "enthusiastic" and the remaining four being
either unenthusiastic or disagreeing about the value of mediation. These results
suffer from the fact that an analysis of only nine cases produces unreliable results.
Id.
63. One article does, however, address the issue of mediation and abusive
couples although not in gender-specific terms. See Dennis Marthaler, Successful
Mediation with Abusive Couples, 23 Mediation Q. 53 (1989). One reason for this
state of affairs may be the mediator's preference for the mediated agreement itself
as the major outcome or effectiveness variable. Thus, Pearson and Thoennes con-
sider "successful" those clients who reach an agreement in mediation. Pearson &
Thoennes, supra note 21, at 256-57. Had the wife been assaulted by her ex-spouse
six months after the agreement was signed, they would, presumably, still be in-
cluded among the successes.
64. See Albie M. Davis & Richard A. Salem, Dealing with Power Imbalances in
the Mediation of Interpersonal Disputes, 6 Mediation Q. 17, 22-23 (1984).
65. Kenneth Cloke, Date Rape and the Limits of Mediation, 21 Mediation Q. 77
(1988) (addressing the issue of whether mediation should be attempted concerning
allegations of violence). See Mediation Q., Nos. 1-23 (1983-1989). Key words used in
the search were "abuse," "aggression," "assault," "battering," and "violence."
66. See Ellis, supra note 11.
67. In this connection, one should note that violence against separating and sep-
arated women by their ex-partners was not included as a consequence of the "pri-
vate ordering" of divorces by Mnookin. See Mnookin, supra note 43.
68. Davis & Salem, supra note 64, at 22.
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that mediation is not appropriate in such cases.69
Tentative empirical support exists for the latter position, that
abused women should not become involved in mediation.70 Among
women who reported being abused during their marriages, re-
searchers found that those who engaged lawyers were less likely
to report post-separation abuse by their ex-partners than those
who participated in mediation. 71 As this was an exploratory study,
caution should be exercised concerning its internal and external
validity. However, a follow-up study involving court-based
mediators yielded similar results.72 Specifically, for abused wo-
men, lawyer intervention correlated more strongly with decreases
in post-separation abuse than did mediator involvement.7 3 The
correlation, it should be noted, was modest.
Risk Markers, Mediation, and Wife Abuse
A risk marker may be defined as any individual, couple (rela-
tional), or situational attribute that increases the probability of
wife abuse among couples participating in the process of media-
tion.74 A perusal of the feminist literature on modes of marital
conflict resolution and their relation to woman abuse identifies
power imbalances, pre-separation violence, privacy norms, and the
presence of alcohol as risk markers for wife abuse among couples
participating in mediation. 75 The status of these four factors as
risk markers for physical abuse derives from the fact that each of
them can be subsumed under four classes of variables entering
into Megargee's general explanation of violent behaviour.76
69. Id. Jay Folberg, one of mediation's more prominent scholars, does deal with
the appropriateness of mediation where the wife has been abused, but he does not
base his advice on cited theory or research. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 20, at 185.
70. Desmond Ellis & Lori Wight, Post-Separation Woman Abuse: The Contribu-
tion of Lawyers, - Victimology - (forthcoming).
71. Id. at -.
72. Desmond Ellis, Judy Ryan & Alfred Choi, Lawyers, Mediators and the
Quality of Life Among Separated and Divorced Women 35-39 (report prepared for
the LaMarsh Research Programme on Violence and Conflict Resolution, York Uni-
versity, North York, Ontario, 1987) [hereinafter Quality of Life].
73. Id.
74. For research on risk markers for woman abuse generally, see Hotaling &
Sugarman, supra note 9.
75. See Jocelynne A. Scutt, The Privatisation of Justice: Power Differentials,
Inequality, and the Palliative of Counselling and Mediation, 11 Women's Studies
Int'l Forum 503 (1988); Mildred Daley Pagelow, Divorce Mediation and Family Vi-
olence, in Newsletter of the California Council on Family Relations (1985); Ministry
of the Attorney General, Ontario, Report of the Attorney General's Advisory Com-
mittee on Mediation in Family Law 74-80 (1989) (Ontario Women's Directorate ob-
jections to mediation in the presence of wife abuse) [hereinafter Report on
Mediation in Family Law].
76. Megargee, supra note 8, at 128-58.
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Following Megargee, four factors enter into the algebra of
wife abuse. 77 These are: (1) the instigation to aggression (the sum
of all factors motivating a husband to hit or hurt his wife); (2)
habit strength (choosing aggressive ways of relating to his wife be-
cause aggression has, in the past, been a reliable way for the hus-
band to control or get what he wants from children, animals,
strangers, and/or his wife); (3) inhibitions against aggression (the
sum of all factors motivating the husband to control the overt ex-
pression of aggression toward his wife); and (4) stimulus factors
(situational factors that increase or facilitate the overt expression
of aggression by the husband toward his wife).78
All empirical associations between any variable and violent
behavior can be subsumed under one or other of Megargee's four
variables.
Power Differences
According to Gulliver, "the interaction between the dispu-
tants prior to entering the public domain [e.g., mediation], becomes
* . . part of, and blends into, the burgeoning [dispute resolution]
process."79 Central to the outcomes of mediation8 0 (apart from
mediated agreements) is the concept of "persuasive strength." 81
The process of mediation, as well as its real life outcomes, is influ-
enced by the relative persuasive strengths of the disputing par-
ties.8 2 These strengths are, in turn, a function of each party's
potential power.8 3 Power connotes the ability of each disputant to
get what each wants, to stop the other from getting what he/she
wants, or to obtain outcomes both want, regardless of the support
or opposition of the other.84
The potential power of each disputant is a function of the re-
sources each party brings to mediation.8 5 Resources refer both to
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Gulliver, supra note 23, at 273.
80. Outcomes or results are tentative. Settlements connote finality. "Out-
comes," says Gulliver, "vary tremendously in their degree of settlement and, in any
case, it is generally impossible to know this until some time after the negotiations
are over." Id. at 78-79.
81. Persuasive strength refers to potential power resources (e.g., coercive, eco-
nomic, normative) that are effectively mobilized during the course of the interac-
tional dispute resolution process. See id. at 200-05.
82. See id. at 200-07.
83. See id. at 201-07.
84. Power refers to "the endeavour by the parties to use the resources available
to them that afford each some negotiating strength and a means of exercising per-
suasion and coercion upon the other." Id. at 187.
85. Potential power is defined as "the various resources available to each party
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material (e.g., property, money) and to normative or symbolic re-
sources (e.g., the husband attempts to increase his persuasive
strength by defending his claims, interests, or behaviour on the
grounds that it conforms with "rules and values that are taken to
be axiomatic and/or to represent the acknowledged social order"8 6
(e.g., a man's home is his castle, wives ought to obey their hus-
bands, wife-beating is justified under some conditions)).
A society characterized by gender inequality, one differenti-
ated and stratified by gender and supporting an institutionalized
ideology justifying male domination in all socially significant con-
texts (educational, political, economic, religious, military), is a soci-
ety that routinely provides husbands with greater resources than
wives.87 Gender inequality, then, is the societal context for the
processing of marital conflicts. Mediation, like adjudication, is in-
fluenced by the social context in which it takes place; mediators
"must construct an outcome in the light of the social and cultural
context [in which mediation takes place].88
To the extent that this is true, a society characterized by
male dominance should produce mediation agreements and court
ordered settlements which reflect male biases. McLindon has pro-
vided evidence that this is true of adjudicated settlements;8 9 the
National Center on Women and Family Law has done the same for
mediation agreements. 90 Evidence from other studies indicates
that the feminization of poverty is associated with the processes of
separating and divorcing.91 Sexist biases, when combined with a
professionally enjoined neutral stance, may help produce media-
tion agreements which are a greater economic disaster for women
than the negotiated agreements produced by lawyers, whose sexist
biases may be muted by the economic and personal biases of the
clients who pay them.
in negotiations . . . resources that provide a possible basis for action." Id. at 201
(emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 192. See also Michael D. Smith, Patriarchal Ideology and Wife Beat-
ing: Evidence from a Survey of Toronto Women (1988) (report to the Ontario Wo-
men's Directorate, Toronto).
87. See Varda Burstyn, Masculine Dominance and the State, in Women, Class,
Family and the State 45, 45-50 (Varda Burstyn & Dorothy Smith eds. 1985).
88. William L.F. Felstiner, Ikfluences of Social Organization on Dispute
Processing, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 63, 74 (1974).
89. See James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of
Divorce for Women and Children, 21 Fain. L.Q. 351 (1987).
90. National Center on Women and Family Law (presentation at the 14th Na-
tional Conference on Women and the Law, Washington D.C., April 10, 1983).
91. McLindon, supra note 89, at 391-95. See also Sylvia Ann Hewlett, A Lesser
Life 51-69 (1986); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected
Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America 323-56
(1985).
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Men usually earn more money and possess more property
than the women from whom they are separating or whom they are
divorcing.92 These economic inequalities characterize the majority
of couples served by mediators. In addition to inequalities in eco-
nomic resources, one may have to consider inequalities in fear (of
the other spouse and of the process) and in apparent "ignorance"
of family finances. The emotional impact of unfamiliarity with the
rules, procedures, and matters of substance pertaining to the mari-
tal conflict resolution process may also be important considera-
tions.9 3 As Walker, among others, has pointed out, husbands who
dominate their wives or who use or threaten to use force as a tool
of coercion are far more likely than other husbands to induce low
self-esteem and a sense of helplessness in their wives.94 Low self-
esteem and learned helplessness lead many women to withdraw
into themselves and to come to believe derogatory comments their
husbands make about them.95 Eventually, most women experienc-
ing this kind of domination do not stay in the relationship; they
leave.96 It is not unreasonable to suggest that these women would
find it especially difficult to sit face-to-face as equals with their ex-
partners in mediation sessions.
Taken together, inequalities between husbands and wives
tend to influence women to sign mediation agreements leaving
them with custody of the children but which do not necessarily
leave them better off financially than they would have been had
they hired lawyers.9 7 Although many women prefer to live in pov-
erty with their children rather than continue in unhappy mar-
riages, these same women are likely, for financial reasons, to
become economically dependent on the next man with whom they
become involved or to return to their husbands who may have
abused them. Women who are more financially secure are less
92. See Weitzman, supra note 91, at 323-43; Ellen Gray, Attitudes and Ideologi-
cal Orientations of Mediators 7 (paper presented at LaMarsh Research Programme
on Violence and Conflict Resolution Seminar, York University, North York, Onta-
rio, April 1988).
93. Ellis & Wight, supra note 70, at -.
94. Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Study, in The Dark
Side of Families: Current Family Violence Research 31, 42-43 (David Finkelhor,
Richard J. Gelles, Gerald T. Hotaling & Murray A. Straus eds. 1983).
95. See Randall Collins, Sociological Insight: An Introduction to Nonobvious So-
ciology 69 (1982) (subjection to coercion and constant brutality causes people to
"withdraw... within a shell" and "makes them appear to be stupid").
96. M.D. Schwartz, Marital Status and Spousal Violence Theory (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, St.
Louis, Missouri, March 1980).
97. See Richardson, supra note 40, at 33. In this study, Richardson also reports
that "divorce mediation does not in general have a positive impact on compliance
with maintenance orders." Id.
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likely to have to do this.98 A number of studies have shown that
economic dependence facilitates woman abuse.99 Thus, the greater
the number of women whose separation/divorce leaves them
poorer and with dependent minors, the greater will be the number
of women who become economically dependent on men. The
greater the number of women who are economically dependent on
men, ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of woman abuse. A neu-
tral mediator, one who does not help empower women to help
themselves rectify existing or future inequalities, makes an indi-
rect contribution to woman abuse by helping to feminize poverty
among separating and divorcing women.
Some scholars do view mediation as an empowering process, a
process in which the mediator "exploit[s] mediation's innate ability
to address power imbalances" in such a way as to support the
spouse with weaker persuasive strength.100 The same scholars also
insist upon the neutrality of the mediatorlo i These authors leave
unclear how they would resolve this contradiction in practice.1 02
Other scholars, such as Folberg and Taylor, suggest that mediation
is inappropriate where "inequality is a permanent condition or one
that cannot be effectively dealt with in mediation-such as physi-
cal abuse or intimidation, a total disparity in financial sophistica-
tion, [or the] significantly lower intelligence of one participant
.... "103 In light of presently available evidence, this would appear
to be good advice.
For mediators in private practice, however, this advice must
be weighed against the economic consequences of decreasing the
pool of eligible clients by increasing the number of reasons for ex-
cluding couples from mediation. In a recent survey of private
mediators, almost all indicated they would mediate for all couples
who could pay them.104 This hints at the link between economic
realities and professional advice. Some supporters of mediation be-
lieve that "the economic circumstances in which the lawyer-client
98. For Richer, For Poorer (Canadian Film Board 1986).
99. See, e.g., Debra S. Kalmuss & Murray A. Straus, Wife's Marital Depen-
dency and Wife Abuse, 44 J. Marriage & Faro. 277 (1982); Michael J. Strube &
Linda S. Barbour, The Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship: Economic De-
pendence and Psychological Commitment, 45 J. Marriage & Faro. 785 (1983).
100. Davis & Salem, supra note 64, at 18.
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id. at 24 (identifying six conditions under which it is appropriate to termi-
nate mediation).
103. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 20, at 185.
104. Gray, supra note 92, at 26 (Of ten mediators surveyed, eight would take all
clients who could pay, including "clients who abuse alcohol and drugs, [who had]
beaten wives while married and . .. who beat their wives during the process of
mediation.").
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relationship is embedded" cause strains between lawyer and client
which may adversely influence the processing of their case.1 05 The
same criticism may apply to mediators.
As a process, marital conflict mediation puts a premium on
the possession by each spouse of relevant knowledge, of communi-
cation and bargaining skills, and of feelings of security and self-
confidence requisite to using their knowledge and skills to reach,
via compromise and cooperation, an agreement which will ensure
the best possible set of post-separation outcomes for all concerned.
For couples who possess these resources to an equal degree, media-
tion may be less harmful or more harmful than negotiation and lit-
igation; mediation offers no guarantees. All too frequently,
however, spouses are not equal in their persuasive strengths.
When combined with the neutrality of mediators, the greater per-
suasive strength of husbands gives them freer rein to obtain the
kind of agreement they want. To the degree to which such agree-
ments further impoverish wives and their children and make them
economically dependent on men with whom they cohabit, media-
tion facilitates woman abuse.
Pre-Separation Violence
A number of scholars contend that, instead of solving the
problem of abuse of married and separated women, mediation may
actually increase the risk of violence directed against them by
their partners.10 6 This is most likely to happen where the woman
has already experienced physical abuse during her marriage.1 0 7
Past violence is a good predictor of future violence; 0 8 violence the-
ory and research support the scholars' contention.1 0 9 Well over
half of the women who seek to separate from and/or divorce their
husbands include physical abuse among the reasons given for their
decision.110 Given this, one would expect mediators to be sensi-
105. Professional Intervention, supra note 18, at 267. In much of the literature
critical of lawyers, lawyers are described in unidimensional-adversarial terms that
bear little relation to the variability of lawyer roles or stances one discovers in prac-
tice. But see Contribution of Lawyers, supra note 18; I. Sylvan Brown, Good Law-
yers Needn't be Gladiators, Fam. Advoc., Spring 1984, at 4 (1984).
106. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 4, at 86-87; Stallone, supra note 6, at 510-12.
107. See Lerman, supra note 4, at 86-87; Stallone, supra note 6, at 510-12.
108. John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical
Techniques (1981).
109. See Jeffrey A. Fagan, Douglas K. Stewart & Karen V. Hansen, Violent Men
or Violent Husbands?, in The Dark Side of Families: Current Family Violence Re-
search 52 (David Finkelhor, Richard J. Gelles, Gerald T. Hotaling & Murray A.
Straus eds. 1983); Megargee, supra note 8, at 125.
110. See Michael David Freeman, Violence in the Home: A Socio-Legal Study 42-
44 (1985). See also Linda MacLeod, Wife Battering in Canada: The Vicious Circle 20
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tized to those problems.
Despite the fact that between one-half and three-quarters of
the women who wish to separate may have been physically abused
by their husbands, many mediators appear to have little interest in
dealing with wife abuse as a significant problem in its own right."n
In addition, violence as a "presenting problem" tends to be ne-
glected in favour of the quest for its underlying causes. 112 Where
these are deep or intractable, they tend not to be amenable to
change.13 As a result, husbands who beat their wives during mar-
riage may come to believe either that their violent habits do not
present a serious problem or that little can be done to change
them.14
Given the strength of the above arguments, one might enter-
tain the possibility that the critics have overstated their case, that
mediators take pre-separation wife abuse so seriously that they
have developed "exclusion rules"115 covering wife abusers and
have incorporated them into their professional codes of ethics. A
review of all issues of Family Law published between 1980 and
1987 reveals no evidence of wife abusers being excluded from me-
diation.116 Actually, the absence of exclusion rules itself is nota-
ble. The implicit assumption seems to be that every separating
couple can benefit from mediation.117 This assumption is clearly
evident in the codes of ethics of such professional groups as the
Ontario Association for Family Mediation.118
Permitting wife abusers to participate in mediation enhances
(1980) (Of 47,522 women requesting divorce applications in Canada in 1978, 2,800 ap-
plied for divorce on grounds of mental or physical cruelty only. In applications
based on multiple grounds, 17,116 included physical cruelty.).
111. Report on Mediation in Family Law, supra note 75, at 78-80. In this report,
mediation is deemed to be unsuitable for wives only when the past violence of their
husbands has rendered them "incapable of negotiating." Id. at 80. Wives who have
experienced violence, even severe violence, but who are assessed as being capable of
negotiating are acceptable as candidates for mediating. For a more general analysis
of this report, see Desmond Ellis, A Critical Analysis of the Attorney General's Ad-
visory Committee Report on Mediation and Family Law (unpublished ms.,
LaMarsh Research Programme on Violence and Conflict Resolution, York Univer-
sity, Ontario, Canada).
112. Felstiner & Williams, supra note 42, at 224.
113. See id. at 237-39.
114. See Stallone, supra note 6, at 511.
115. These are rules identifying the conditions under which mediation is to be
excluded because it is inappropriate. See Davis & Salem, supra note 64, at 24.
116. See Fam. L., vols. 10-17 (1980-1987).
117. See id. In this connection, see Mediation Rep. (March 1989). Here, the
problem and prospects of mediating marital conflicts involving woman abuse is
ignored.
118. See Ontario Association, supra note 42, at ii-xi.
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their persuasive strength vis-&-vis their wives. 119 Abused women
are often timorous around their husbands. Timorous wives usually
do not make good advocates for their own positions.120 They tend
to be neither forceful nor articulate in stating their legitimate
claims to custody, support, and property when they must do so fac-
ing the men who have beaten them.121 The end result may be that
they sign agreements which are economically disadvantageous.
Difficult post-separation economic circumstances tend, as was
noted earlier, to invite new relationships with men who abuse
them.122
Privacy Norms
The family, regarded as a prison for women by some schol-
ars,123 has been socially constructed as a "private domain."124
Norms of privacy govern family relations in homes.125 With re-
spect to wife abuse, these norms function in the same way inmate
codes operate in prisons.126 For both beaten wives and inmates, re-
porting violence is "snitching"-a deviation from behavioral
norms. These norms make wife abuse more probable by making
the reporting of wife abuse to outsiders a form of deviance. 127 Pri-
119. This inference is based on the conceptualization of violence against women
as a form of social control the effects of which are lasting and generalized across
situations. In this connection, see Jalna Hamner & Mary Maynard, Women, Vio-
lence and Social Control 6 (1987); Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 148
(1979); Okun, supra note 12, at 113-39.
120. See Ellis & DeKeseredy, supra note 17, at -.
121. See Lerman, supra note 4, at 73, 90-91; Stallone, supra note 6, at 510.
122. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Tove Stang Dahl & Annika Snare, The Coercion of Privacy: A
Feminist Perspective, in Women, Sexuality and Social Control 8, 21-23 (Carol
Smart & Barry Smart eds. 1978).
When I was doing research on violence in prisons, it soon became obvious that
the "inmate code"-a set of rules enjoining self-help, no snitching to guards, loyalty
to other inmates-served a number of functions. One of the most important of
these was that it served the interests of inmates who ran the institution. An effec-
tive inmate code enabled them more fully to exploit, coerce, and beat up other in-
mates with little fear of punishment by prison staff. In an inmate social world
constucted as "private," making a spectacle out of secrets by snitching to staff was a
very serious form of inmate deviance. Very bad things would happen to snitches.
Other potential snitches take such warnings seriously. A murder or a loss of an eye
quite effectively reinforces inmate norms. Desmond Ellis, Violence in Prisons 48-90
(unpublished ms., Bethune College, York University, Ontario, 1986) [hereinafter
Violence in Prisons].
124. The family is a private domain insofar as it is characterized by relative in-
visibility and self-help with respect to domestic disturbances, including violence
against women. See Stang Dahl & Snare, supra note 123, at 12-14, 19-21.
125. See Jan Pahl, Private Violence and Public Policy 13-17, 186-91 (1985).
126. Violence in Prisons, supra note 123.
127. See Pahl, supra note 125, at 27.
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vacy norms surrounding the family support and encourage wife
abuse by keeping it a secret.128
Mediators appear to be active supporters of family privacy
norms. They invariably include confidentiality rules in their codes
of ethics.129 Although there are exceptions to this rule,130 rarely,
if ever, will a mediator report a male participant to the police for
assaulting his wife-a criminal offence.' 3 ' While it is possible that
wives do not tell mediators that they have been (or are being)
physically abused, mediators seem to make no special effort to find
out.132 In cases where they do discover wife abuse, they may tend
to treat the matter as confidential.' 33 So, in addition to abused
wives not tending to report their abuse to the police, neither may
mediators. Beyond supporting family privacy norms, mediators of-
fer self-help solutions to husband-wife conflicts, such solutions be-
ing central to the process of mediation.13 4 This combination of
forces-privacy plus self-help--is as advantageous to wife abusers
in homes as it is to violent inmate leaders in prisons.135 As a
whole process, mediation discourages both the reporting of wife
abuse and active intervention by third parties to stop it.
Mediation does operate in "the shadow of the law" in the
sense that family law and lawyers must be involved in determining
the legal status of mediation agreements and also in enforcing
them. However, the shadow of the law is not likely to extend to
criminal law violations, such as assault, where a couple engages in
a process which encourages them to work things out for them-
selves and to keep their abusive experiences a private matter-as
if abuse were just another embarrassing or hurtful experience to
be discussed privately (but openly) in the mediator's presence. 136
Privacy norms surrounding the family are routinely mentioned as
128. See id. at 5-17, 186-91.
129. See, e.g., Ontario Association, supra note 42, at iii-iv.
130. Id. at iv (exception to confidentiality rule "where the information discloses
an actual or potential threat to human life or safety or a ... breach of the [c]riminal
[c]ode").
131. In over four years of research on mediation, I have yet to hear of such a
case.
132. See Quality of Life, supra note 72, at 51.
133. See Gray, supra note 92, at 17 (Of ten mediators surveyed, five indicated
"that anything a mediator hears during [mediation] should never be revealed to
anyone else without the permission of both [mediation participants].").
134. Folberg, supra note 32, at 9 ("The ultimate authority in mediation belongs
to the parties themselves .... ").
135. In both contexts, it is useful to those who use violence to control others to
have norms prescribing privacy and self-help. See Violence in Prisons, supra note
123.
136. See Stallone, supra note 6, at 512; Girdner, supra note 6.
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supporting, if not encouraging, wife abuse. 137 In the reality of wo-
men's lives, they have a devastating effect.
Alcohol and Drugs
A number of studies have indicated that alcohol and drug
abuse strongly correlate with both the likelihood and seriousness
of violence in general and wife abuse in particular.l38 Some medi-
ation programmes and some mediators do exclude husbands who
abuse alcohol or drugs, but others do not.139 Those that do not oc-
casionally have to deal with participants who turn up for media-
tion sessions drunk or stoned.140
Alcohol and drug abuse constitute what Felstiner and Wil-
liams might call "the deep end of maladaptations," those kinds of
maladaptations that mediation is least likely to deal with effec-
tively.141 When mediators do attempt to deal with them, they may
inadvertently facilitate wife abuse.142 This is likely to occur when
the mediation agreement becomes a "license to hit."'143 Consider
"The Case of the Astute Mediator":
[H]e hits her when she nags, she nags when he drinks, he
drinks to ease the pain of living and living is continually pain-
ful. While mediation cannot cope with his underlying dissatis-
faction, an astute mediator may see that if she breaks the cycle
by not nagging when he has been drinking, she may avoid the
beatings which constitute the complaint which brought her to
mediation. An agreement in such a case might specify that he
agrees not to hit her and she agrees not to nag him. Such an
agreement might work ... because a mediator was alert to a
feasible adjustment in a destructive cycle of interaction.' 44
Here, the mediator regarded as "astute" by Felstiner and Williams
has helped the couple sign an agreement which the husband could
interpret in the following way: it's all right for me to hit her if she
violates the agreement by nagging. If one kind of domestic devi-
ance-her nagging-justifies his hitting her, then perhaps hitting
her is also an appropriate response to other kinds of domestic devi-
ance such as her failure to have meals ready on time, and so on. In
137. See Pahl, supra note 125, at 13-17, 188-91.
138. See, e.g., Quality of Life, supra note 72, at 36-37; but see Joseph Zacker &
Morton Bard, Further Findings on Assaultiveness and Alcohol Use in Interpersonal
Disputes, 5 Am. J. Community Psychology 373, 381-82 (1977).
139. See Felstiner & Williams, supra note 42, at 238; Stallone, supra note 6, at
506.
140. Felstiner & Williams, supra note 42, at 238.
141. See id. at 236-39, 243-44.
142. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
143. Straus, supra note 10, at 40 (coining the term "hitting license").
144. Felstiner & Williams, supra note 42, at 236.
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describing an example of good mediation, Felstiner and Williams
define her nagging and his beatings-a criminal offence-as
merely "shallow end maladaptions." 145
In this particular case, an astute mediator, if he/she were
concerned with stopping the violence, would make further media-
tion contingent upon the male abuser's reliance on a non-violent
way of dealing with the victim's nagging, and seeking professional
help for his drinking problem, and making benefits of some kind
contingent upon the use of more benign ways of relating to each
other as husband and wife. One of the benefits could be a sliding
reduction in mediation fees for couples who, during the course of
mediation, refrain from criminal acts of violence and extreme
provocation. In short, astute mediators would do more to demon-
strate their astuteness by helping couples formulate agreements
which, minimally, would clearly communicate that physical vio-
lence is legally and morally wrong, that punishment by legal au-
thorities would be made contingent on further violence, and which
would clearly identify alternate, non-violent ways of resolving
disputes.
Summary and Conclusions
The transition from one marital status (married) to another
(separated) does not mean the end of wife abuse for the women
involved. Often, the abuse continues. According to a number of
critics, mediating this transition does not routinely improve
spousal relations, despite mediators' claims. Mediating marital
conflicts may perpetuate abuse of participating wives. This hap-
pens because of power differences, pre-separation abuse, privacy
norms, and drug and/or alcohol involvement. Power differences
interact with an impartial mediator to increase the probability of
abuse by males other than the husband. Pre-separation abuse
tends to be associated with post-separation abuse because
mediators do little to break the link between an abusive past and a
violent future or to exclude pre-separation wife abusers from me-
diation. Privacy norms help keep wife abuse a secret. Secret wife
abusers are neither deterred nor helped by outside intervention,
including the intervention of mediators. Permitting husbands who
abuse alcohol and/or drugs to participate in mediation helps in-
crease the chances of post-separation abuse by providing opportu-
nities and "reasons" for abuse.
Three major conclusions may be drawn from this paper.
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First, post-separation woman assault is a serious matter, a criminal
offence. It should be treated as such by mediators. Stopping the
violence and/or attempting to decrease its future probability
should be as important an objective as any other included in the
lexicon of mediator goals. Where a criminal offence is involved,
disclosure, rather than privacy norms, should govern mediator
conduct.
Second, mediation is inappropriate in the presence of pre-sep-
aration abuse and alcohol and/or drug abuse.
Third, priority must be given to mediation as an empowering
process where differences in persuasive strengths exist but are not
so marked or ingrained as to vitiate the efforts made by wife-
participants to help themselves. Where power imbalances are
great and the woman thoroughly brow-beaten, mediation is
inappropriate.

